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Abstract
This note shows that, with pre-set price and capital decisions of firms facing
uncertainty and financial market imperfections, price, mark up and the expected
degree of capacity utilization (resp. capital) decreases (resp. increases) with the
firm internal net worth.
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1. Introduction
In a recent paper, Chevallier et Scharfstein [1996] provided empirical evidence of a
relationship between mark up and leverage and proposed a theoretical underpinning
based on the “consumer switching cost” model of Klemperer [1987]. A complementary
approach is proposed in this note. I show that a relationship between price, capital
and financial structure obtains when the firm faces uncertainty with ex post risk of
excess capacity, as in Kahn [1992] and Karlin and Carr [1962]. In this model, price
depends on expected “tensions” in the goods markets. The higher the probability of
excess demand, the higher the market power which determines the markup. Optimal
capital depends on the ratio of the mark-up to the cost of capital. The two decisions
are linked.
Therefore, introducing Kiyotaki and Moore [1997] incentive problem leading to a
liquidity constraint aﬀects not only investment but also price behaviour. The rise
of external finance constraint limits capital and increase the probability of excess
demand. Simultaneously, the firm rises the price, which lowers expected demand and
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the probability of excess demand. In so doing, the loss of investment due to the agency
problem is partially oﬀset by an increase of market power.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 solves
the perfect capital market case. Section 4 solves the financially constrained case.
Section 5 concludes.
2. The model
The production function is clay-clay, with constant returns to scale for capital and
labour. Capital is chosen ex ante and defines productive capacities Y C = K/k. The
ratio capital /capacity is k. The cost of capital is denoted c. The output market is
cleared ex post by an adjustment of hours worked, except if demand is higher than
productive capacities:
L = aY for 0 ≤ Y ≤ Y C (2.1)
The productivity of labour is 1/a. The manager is a price-taker for labour and the
unit cost of labour is denoted w. The price of capital is taken as numeraire and may
be diﬀerent of the output price.
The entrepreneur faces uncertainty on demand. g(p) is the firm’s expected demand.
It satisfies the standard general requirements for an unique optimal monopoly price
in the certainty case. It is a decreasing function of price p (g(p) ≥ 0, gp(p) < 0 with a
price-elasticity e (p) = pgp (p) /g (p) < −1). Demand is zero (g (p) = 0) for all prices
such that p ≥ pmax. The requirement for a positive production is that the maximal
price pmax is over the marginal costs of production pmax > wa+ ck > 0. I assume the
function
h(p) = (p− wa− ck) gp (p) + g (p) (2.2)
to be continuous and to have a unique zero being the price pc such as wa+ ck ≤ pc <
pmax. If the maximal price pmax is infinite (g (p) > 0 for all prices p ≥ 0, I assume
that limp→+∞ g (p) = limp→+∞ pg (p) = 0 and that the function h(p) is continuous and
presents a unique zero for the price pc such as wa+ ck ≤ pc.
Demand is ug(p), where u is a non-negative random variable of cumulative distri-
bution F , and of a continuous density f , with a mean equal to one (E [u] = 1 where
E represents the expectation operator).
Ex-post, firm production is set at the minimum of production capacity and of
demand, Y = min(ug(p), Y C). This is based on the following assumption on short
run rigidities: ex-post goods market price rigidity, the second-hand market for excess
investment does not work, investment and hours worked are not substitutable ex-post
(Kahn [1992] and Karlin and Carr [1962]).
The entrepreneur sets ex ante price and capital while maximizing expected profits
denoted π(K, p):
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(K, p) ∈ Argmax π(K, p) = (p− wa)E [Y ]− cK (2.3)
with K ≥ 0 and p ≥ 0. Expected production is:
E[Y ] = E[min(Y C, ug(p))] = g(p)
Z x
0
u · dF (u) + Y C
Z +∞
x
dF (u) (2.4)
where x = Y C/g (p) is the capacity/expected demand ratio, measuring the ex-
pected “tensions” on the goods market. By integration by parts, as E[u] = 1 and as
u ≥ 0 (so that
R+∞
0 [1− F (u)] du = 1), one has:
E[Y ] = g(p)I(x) where I(x) =
Z x
0
1− F (u) · du (2.5)
I(x) represents the sum of the probabilities of excess demand up to the level of
capital related to x.
Following Kiyotaki and Moore [1997], I add two critical assumptions. First the
entrepreneur’s technology is idiosyncratic: once his production started at date 0, he
is the only agent to have the skill necessary for production to occur. If he withdraws
his firm specific labour L between date 0 and date 1, there would remain only durable
capital K. Second, he cannot precommit to work. He may therefore threaten his
creditors by withdrawing his firm specific labour and repudiate his debt contract.
Creditors protect themselves from the threat of repudiation. Hart and Moore [1994]
give an argument to suggest that the entrepreneur may be able to negotiate the debt
(gross of interest) down to the liquidation value of capital, which eventually incurs
a transaction cost τ . At the initial date, the entrepreneur can borrow an amount of
external finance K −W , where W represents the firm internal net worth, as long as
the repayment does not exceed the market value of capital:
(1 + r) (K −W ) ≤ (1− δ)K ⇔ K ≤ 1 + r
r + δ
W (2.6)
r represents the real interest rate, δ represents the depreciation rate. The cost of
capital c is equal to r + δ.
3. The Perfect Capital Market Case
In the perfect capital market case, the first order condition with respect to capital is:
(p− wa)(1− F (x))− ck = 0. (3.1)
The marginal cost of capital is equal to the marginal profits at full capacity utilisa-
tion, corrected by the probability of use of this capacity. The price p has to be strictly
over the sum of marginal costs wa+ ck to have a strictly positive optimal capital (else
0 < p ≤ wa+ ck ⇒ K∗ = 0).
The first order condition with respect to price is:
3
0 =
"
E [Y ] + (p− wa)∂E [Y ]
∂g (p)
gp (p)
#
p
g (p)
g (p)
E [Y ]
(3.2)
⇒ p = η (x) e (p)
η (x) e (p) + 1
wa for x > η−1
Ã
− 1
e (p)
!
(3.3)
where:
0 ≤ η(x) = g (p)
E [Y ]
∂E [Y ]
∂g (p)
= 1− xIx(x)
I(x)
≤ 1. (3.4)
The elasticity of expected output with respect to price is the chained elasticity
of expected output with respect to expected demand η(x) times the the elasticity of
expected demand with respect to price. In the certainty case, the elasticity of output
with respect to expected demand is indeed equal to 1.
The optimal solution is found by solving the system of the first order conditions.
A proof of the existence of optimal price and capital (and therefore of an optimal
capacity/expected demand ratio x) for any continuous distribution based on the in-
termediate value theorem is given in the appendix. Eliminating price provides the
optimal ratio x∗ in an implicit function form:
j (x∗) = 1− F (x∗) + ck
wa
η (x∗) e (p) +
ck
wa
= 0 (3.5)
As there exist at least a solution for x, if the function j (x∗) is strictly monotonic
for x > η−1
³
− 1
e(p)
´
, then this solution is unique according to the intermediate value
theorem. The derivative jx =
ck
wa
e (p) ηx(x
∗)− f(x∗) is strictly negative if ηx(x∗) > 0.
A suﬃcient condition on the distribution of demand to guarantee ηx(x) > 0, that we
assume to be fulfilled in what follows, is:1
∀x ∈ [0,+∞[ f(x)
1− F (x) ≥
η(x)
x
(3.6)
Diﬀerentiating the function j leads to:
(−Ae (p) ηx(x∗) + f(x∗))| {z }
>0
dx∗+ (−e (p) η(x∗)− 1)| {z }
>0
dA+ (−Aη(x∗))| {z }
<0
de (p) = 0 (3.7)
where A = ck
wa
represents the relative cost of factors corrected by their productivity.
The ratio x∗ a decreasing function of the real interest rate and of the depreciation of
1Unimodal distributions such as the lognormal distribution, the uniform distribution and the
exponential distribution fulfill this condition.
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capital and an increasing function of the real wage and of the price elasticity of the
demand curve.
The optimal price p∗ is:
p∗ =
e (p∗) η
³
x∗
³
ck
wa
, e (p)
´´
e (p∗) η
³
x∗
³
ck
wa
, e (p)
´´
+ 1
wa. (3.8)
It decreases with the ratio x∗ and therefore increases with the cost of capital and
decreases the price-elasticity of demand and has an ambiguous dependance on the real
wage.
The optimal level of capital K∗ is:
K∗ = kg (p∗)x∗
Ã
ck
wa
, e (p∗)
!
. (3.9)
It depends negatively on the cost of capital, positively on the real wage and am-
biguously on the elasticity of demand.
4. The Financially Constrained Case
When the finance constraint is binding, the condition giving the optimal stock of
capital is now:
Kf∗ =
1 + r
r + δ
W < K∗ ⇒ xf = 1 + r
r + δ
W
kg (pf)
< x∗ (4.1)
Capital depends negatively on the interest rate, on the depreciation of capital and
positively on the firm internal net worth.
The marginal condition on price is unchanged. Eliminating price provides the
optimal ratio xf in the financially constrained regime (by definition of x, one has:
p = g−1
³
K
kx
´
):
l (x) =
e (p) η (x)
e (p) η (x) + 1
wa− g−1
Ã
Kf
kx
!
= 0. (4.2)
It is easy to prove with the intermediate value theorem that the solution for x is
unique as limx→η−1(− 1e(p))
l (x) > 0 , limx→+∞ l (x) < 0 and lx (x) < 0 (with ηx (x) > 0).
Diﬀerentiating totally l (x) leads to:
0 =
Ã
e (p) ηx (x)wa
[e (p) η (x) + 1]2
+ g−1p
Ã
Kf
kx
!
Kf
kx2
!
| {z }
<0
dxf −g−1p
Ã
Kf
kx
!
1
kx| {z }
>0
dKf
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+
e (p) η (x) a
e (p) η (x) + 1| {z }
>0
dw+
η (x)wa
[e (p) η (x) + 1]2| {z }
>0
de (p)
As in the perfect capital market case, the ratio xf is a decreasing function of the
real interest rate and of the depreciation of capital and an increasing function of the
real wage and of the price elasticity of the demand curve. But in the financially
constrained regime, it is also an increasing function of the firm internal net worth.
The price when the financial constraint binds, denoted pf , is:
pf =
e
³
pf
´
η
³
xf
´
e (pf) η (xf) + 1
wa (4.3)
Price is a decreasing function of the ratio x. As xf < x∗, the price when the
finance constraint is binding is higher than the price chosen in the perfect capital
market case. It is a decreasing function of the price elasticity of the demand curve
and of the firm internal net worth and an increasing function of the real interest rate
and of the depreciation of capital. Its dependance on the real wage is ambiguous.2
The optimal expected degree of capacity utilisation E [Y ] /Y C = I(x∗)/x∗ is also a
decreasing function of the ratio x, due to the concavity of the function I(x). Therefore,
it is an increasing function of the real interest rate and of the depreciation of capital
and a decreasing function of the real wage and of the price elasticity of the demand
curve, in the perfect capital market case. When the financial constraint binds, it is
also a decreasing function of the firm internal net worth.
The condition on financial structure for a shift of regimes is obtained as by the
solution (x, p,W ) of the system of the two first order conditions and of the binding
financial constraint. For a suﬃciently high level of the firm internal net worth (an
implicit function W ∗ (r, w)), the firms shifts to the uncontrained regime.
5. Conclusion
This note shows that with pre-set price and capital decisions of firms facing uncertainty
and financial market imperfections, price, mark up and the expected degree of capacity
utilization (resp. capital) decreases (resp. increases) with the firm internal net worth.
Further research could consider dynamic general equilibrium extensions of this model
to investigate the cyclical properties of mark-up, capital or inventories, the degree of
capacity utilization and financial structure.
2The dependance of the mark up pf/(wa+ ck) on the cost of capital is also ambiguous.
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5.1. Appendix: Existence of the optimal solution (K, p)
The second order necessary and suﬃcient condition with respect to capital is always
fulfilled except if the density of the distribution is zero for the ratio x∗:
πKK(K, p) = −f (x∗)
p− wa
g (p)
< 0 (5.1)
We maximize profit with respect to price incorporating the marginal condition on
the choice of capital : p∗ ∈ Argmaxπ(K∗, p). The intermediate value theorem applied
to the first order derivative of expected profits with respect to price πp helps to prove
that this derivative presents at least a zero which is a local maximum.
First, when p = wa + ck, optimal capital is zero (x∗ = F−1 (0) = 0) so that
expected profits are zero. Second, when the price tends to infinity, expected profits
tend to be negative: as limx→+∞ I (x) =
R+∞
0 [1− F (u)] · du = 1, and knowing the
hypotheses limp→+∞ g (p) = limp→+∞ pg (p) = 0, one has:
lim
p→+∞
π(K∗, p) = lim
p→+∞
g (p) [(p− wa) I(x∗)− ckx∗] ≤ 0 (5.2)
To apply the intermediate value theorem, it is now only suﬃcient to prove that
πp (K, p = wa+ ck) > 0, which is done as follows:
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πp(K
∗, p) = [gp (p) (p− wa) + g (p)] I(x∗)− gp (p) ckx∗ (5.3)
= [(p− wa− ck)gp (p) + g (p)] ·| {z } I(x∗)>0
=h(p)>0 for wa+ck<p<pc
+ck gp (p)| {z }
<0
(I(x∗)− x∗)| {z }
<0
(5.4)
I(x) =
R x
0 [1− F (u)] du ≤ x is an immediate result. h (p) = (p− wa− ck)gp (p) +
g (p) is the derivative of profits where there is no uncertainty. By assumption, it is
zero for the optimal monopoly price pc. Therefore, h (p) > 0 for values of the price
such that: wa + ck < p < pc. Hence, πp (K
∗, p) > 0 for values of the price such that:
wa+ ck < p < pc. QED.
One remarks that price under certainty is lower than price under uncertainty:
πp (K
c, pc) > 0. When the random shock is multiplicative, increasing the price implies
a lower standard error on sales: σD = σu | g (p) |.
There may be n local maxima (and n− 1 local minima) which may be related to
the modes of the density function f . A suﬃcient condition for unicity is to have a
monotonous elasticity η(x).
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